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WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A SALARIED
EMPLOYEE? THE FUTURE OF PAY-DOCKING
Kimberly A. Pace*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has experienced a demographic revolution in the composition of
the workforce, with profound consequences for the lives of working men and wom-
en and their families .... Today, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 96
percent of fathers and 65 percent of mothers work outside the home .... Today
more than 45 percent of the U.S. labor force are women. Equally dramatic has
been the substantial increase in the number of single parent households.'
Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act2 ("FMLA") to respond to
the need for job protected leave created by these economic and social changes and to
protect the integrity of the modem family.3 Following the enactment of the FMLA,
and, purportedly in further pursuit of those same interests, the Workplace Leave Fair-
ness Act ("WLFA") was introduced in both the House and the Senate." Proponents of
this bill, which would amend the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), claim that its
purpose is to reverse a Department of Labor ("DOL") ruling which limits workplace
flexibility.5 They claim that the current ruling is inconsistent with the purpose of the
FMLA because it prevents employers from granting unpaid leave to salaried employees
for less than a full day.6 Proponents also claim that there is a need for this bill be-
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis. J.D. (cum laude) 1994, Georgetown University Law Center M.S.
1991, B.S.E.E. 1990, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I would like to thank Professor Michael
Gottesman of the Georgetown University Law Center for his assistance with this article. The views
expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the policies or opinions of Kirkland & Ellis.
1. S. REP. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7-8.
2. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C. (1993 and Supp. 1993)).
3. The stated statutory purpose of the FMLA is:
(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the
stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserv-
ing family integrity;
(2) to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or
adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious
health condition;
29 U.S.C. § 2601(b).
4. See H.R. 1309, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1354, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
5. See 139 CONG. REc. E622-02 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993) [hereinafter Andrews] (statement of
Rep. Andrews); 139 CONG. REc. E616-03 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993) [hereinafter Petri] (statement of
Rep. Petri); Pay-Docking Rule Could Cost Employers Billions, Former Labor Solicitor Says, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 126 at d3 (July 2, 1993) [hereinafter Kilberg] (statement of William J. Kilberg For-
mer Solicitor, United States Department of Labor before the House Subcommittee on Labor Standards);
139 CONG. REc. S10,381-02 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1993) [hereinafter Kassebaum] (statement of Sen.
Kassebaum); 139 CONG. REC. S10,382 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1993) [hereinafter Pressler] (statement of Sen.
Pressler).
6. See sources cited supra note 5; Sen. Kassebaum Will Introduce Bill To Eliminate DOL's Pay-
Journal of Legislation
cause recent court interpretations of the FLSA have misconstrued the law and hindered
the ability of the workplace to be family-friendly.7
This article argues that while conflicting court opinions on the pay-docking and
leave provisions of the FLSA do leave employers without guidance as to the legitima-
cy of their leave provisions, the amendments contained in the WLFA are not the fami-
ly-friendly answer that they claim to be. The proposed bill attacks the very foundation
of what it means to be a salaried employee. The WLFA would result in a windfall for
employers, who would be allowed to dock employees for partial day absences, without
being required to compensate them for overtime. The actual purpose of the bill is to
diminish the potential liability companies face in this era of DOL enforcement, not to
assist the modem family or to create a more flexible workplace as its proponents
claim.
Part II of this article examines the purpose behind the recently enacted FMLA.
Part III details the relevant portions of the FLSA and the conflicting court opinions
about pay-docking which have left the law unsettled and confusing for employers and
courts alike to follow. Part IV considers the WLFA as proposed in the House and
Senate. It discusses the bill's alleged purpose and its relationship to the FMLA, as well
as the actual effects the bill would have if it were enacted by Congress. It argues that
the proposed bill is not well suited to its alleged purpose. Part V suggests that the
confusion and unpredictability in the law, created by conflicting court opinions, leaves
unsuspecting employers exposed to potentially enormous liability if their pay practices
are found to violate the FLSA. Therefore, this article suggests that Congress or the
Supreme Court should act to end the confusion over the salary basis test and clarify
the law. Part V also proposes the structure for such a solution--one that, unlike the
proposals now before Congress, would not destroy the fundamental concept of being a
salaried employee.
I. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993
The enactment of the FMLA was long overdue. The United States was one of
the last industrialized countries in the world without a family leave law.' The FMLA
was the product of an eight year federal effort to enact legislation to respond to the
needs of the modem workforce and modem family.9 This effort was thwarted twice by
President Bush who vetoed prior bills. 0 Upon signing the FMLA into law on Feb-
ruary 5, 1993, President Clinton stated: "[tihe need for this legislation is clear. The
American workforce has changed dramatically in recent years. These changes have
created a substantial and growing need for family and medical leave for working
Americans.""1
The FMLA addresses the working parents' need for flexibility in the workplace
Docking Rule, Daily Lab. Rep. Current Dev. (BNA) No. 148, at A-4 (Aug. 4, 1993).
7. Sen. Kassebaum Will Introduce Bill To Eliminate DOL's Pay-Docking Rule, supra note 6.
8. See S. REP. No. 3 at 19, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21. However, 35 states have enacted some
form of family leave legislation. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of. 1993, Daily Lab. Rep.
Special Supplement (BNA) No. 24, at S-3 (Feb. 8, 1993) (eight year effort to pass federal leave act).
9. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, supra note 8 (eight year effort to pass fed-
eral leave act).
10. See Clinton Signs Family Leave Bill Into Law, Proclaims End of Gridlock, Daily Lab. Rep.
Current Dev. (BNA) No. 24, at AA-l (Feb. 8, 1993).
11. Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 1, 29 WKLY. COMP. PRES.
Doc. 144 (Feb. 5, 1993).
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by mandating that employers allow their employees to take up to twelve weeks of
unpaid leave per year for family emergencies.12 Congress enacted this legislation to
protect the integrity of the family because while the demographics of the workforce
and the structure of the American family had changed, employer leave policies had
not. 3 "Private sector practices and government policies have failed to adequately re-
spond to recent economic and social changes that have intensified the tensions between
work and family. This failure continues to impose a heavy burden on families, employ-
ees, employers and the broader society."' 4
Although the FMLA applies equally to workers across the economic spectrum, it
is specifically designed to protect the low wage workers because these workers are
least likely to be covered under any existing family leave policies." The FMLA man-
dates that eligible employees 6 are entitled to twelve workweeks of unpaid leave per
year for the birth or adoption of a child or for serious health conditions 7 of the em-
ployee or the employee's family member.' The employee is free to take leave to care
for herself or a family member in whatever increments are medically necessary. 9 If
partial day absences are necessary to address a family medical crisis, the employee can
work partial days and the employer can dock the employee's pay for these partial day
absences.'
The FMLA mandates that employers provide the leave which falls within the
bounds of the statute without repercussions. It is unlawful for employers to interfere
with or deny the employee's use of qualified FMLA leave." It is also unlawful for
employers to retaliate against any employee who takes qualified medical leave.22 They
cannot discharge the employee or discriminate against him for taking leave that com-
12. See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2612; S. REP. No. 3 at 4, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6.
13. In the FMLA, Congress found that:
(1) the number of single-parent households and two-parent households in which the sin-
gle parent or both parents work is increasing significantly;
(2) it is important for the development of children and the family unit that fathers and
mothers be able to participate in early childrearing and the care of family members who
have serious health conditions;
(3) the lack of employment policies to accommodate working parents can force individu-
als to choose between job security and parenting;
(4) there is inadequate job security for employees who have serious health conditions
that prevent them from working for temporary periods;
29 U.S.C. § 2601(a).
14. S. REP. No. 3 at 4, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6.
15. S. REP. No. 3 at 16-18, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 18.
16. Employees are eligible for unpaid family and medical leave under the FMLA if they have
been employed by their present employer for at least 12 months and have worked at least 1,250 hours
during that 12 month period. In addition, the FMLA only applies to employers with a minimum of 50
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2).
17. A serious health condition is defined by the FMLA as "an illness, injury, impairment, or
physical or mental condition that involves-(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential
medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider." Id. § 2611(11).
18. Id. § 2 612(a). The employee may take this medical leave in order to care for the employee's
spouse, son, daughter, or parent. Id. § 2602(a)(1)(C). The FMLA defines a son or daughter to include
biological children, foster or step children, a legal ward or a child of a person standing in loco paren-
tis who is under eighteen or over eighteen but unable to care for themselves because of a disability.
Id. § 2611(12).
19. Id. § 2612(b)(1).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 2615(a)(1).
22. Id. § 2 615(a)(2).
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plies with the FMLA.23 The statute also requires that the employee be restored to his
original position or an equivalent position when he returns from FMLA leave.' The
statute even requires that the employer maintain the employee's health benefits during
his absence.'
To ensure compliance with the FMLA, employers are required to keep records
detailing their participation, and the Secretary of Labor has the authority to investigate
them.s If an employer violates any provision of the FMLA, an affected employee can
bring a civil action to recover damages and obtain equitable relief.2" Alternatively, the
Secretary of Labor can bring either an administrative action or a civil action." The
Secretary of Labor also has the power to issue regulations that are necessary to carry
out this statute.2
III. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Under the FLSA, an employer is prohibited from employing a person for a
"workweek longer that forty hours unless such employee receives compensation... at
a rate not less than one and one-half times [his] regular rate."' The goal of the FLSA
is to eliminate low wages and long hours which endanger the health and well being of
the workers and to establish certain minimum labor standards." The forty hour work-
week was established by the FLSA to protect the well being of the workers and to
discourage overtime work in order to spread employment and thereby reduce the
nation's unemployment.32
The objective of the 40 hour week was to improve the quality of life for workers,
both on and off the job .... It is not safe to work workers long hours ... it
erodes social values, and it is not in the public interest to work some workers long
hours while society pays public assistance to those without work.33
23. Id.
24. Id. § 2614(a)(1).
25. Id. § 2614(c)(1).
26. Id. § 2616.
27. Id. § 2617(a)(1). Monetary damages include the lost wages or benefits, interest and liquidated
damages unless the employer can prove that he acted on a good faith belief that he was not violating
the Act. Id. § 2617(a)(l)(A). The court has the discretion to award the employee whatever equitable
relief it deems appropriate which may include reinstatement or promotions. Id. § 2617(a)(l)(B).
28. Id. § 2617(b).
29. Id. § 2654.
30. Id. § 207(a)(1)(1993).
31. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960); Walling v.
Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419 (1945); Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d
1308 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976); Brennan v. Plaza Shoe Store, Inc., 522 F.2d
843 (8th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 478 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 855 (1973); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Wirtz, 381 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
946 (1968); Mitchell v. Empire Gas Eng'g Co., 256 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1958); see also Pressler, supra
note 5, at S10,382.
32. See S. RP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-10 (1961); see also Otto Nathan, Favorable
Implications of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 416, 420 (1939) (the
FLSA's forty hour workweek will increase the health of the worker and his family).
33. Pay-Docking Rule Could Cost Employers Billions, Former Labor Solicitor Says, supra note 5,
at d3 [hereinafter Zalusky] (testimony of John Zalusky, Head of the Office of Wages and Industrial
Relations, Before the House Subcommittee on Labor Standards).
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A. The FLSA Exemption for Professional, Executive and Administrative
Employees
However, Congress created an exemption from the FLSA's overtime provision
for qualified, bona fide executive, administrative or professional employees. 4 The
statute itself offered no definition for executive, administrative or professional employ-
ees but instead, delegated the authority to define and delimit these terms to the Secre-
tary of Labor.3" The DOL regulations establish that an employer must prove that an
employee meets both a "duties test" and a "salary test" in order to qualify for the
exemption.36 First, the employee must perform the duties of an executive, administra-
tive, or professional employee as defined by the regulations." Second, the employee
must be compensated for his services on a salary basis.3" Thus, an employee who
meets both requirements is not entitled to overtime for hours worked in excess of forty
per week. The employer has the burden of proving that the employee meets these tests
and, therefore qualifies for the exemption.39 The employer must prove that the em-
ployee qualifies by clear and convincing evidence' because the exemption provided
by § 213(a)(1) is to be narrowly construed in order to further Congress' goal of pro-
viding broad employment protection.4
Congress exempted professionals, administrators and executives because it be-
34. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1988).
35. Id. It is well established that the DOL regulations which define and delimit these terms are
valid and binding and have the force and effect of law. See, e.g., Marshall v. Hendersonville Bowling
Ctr., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 510 (M.D. Tenn. 1980), af'd, 672 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1981); Craig v. Far
West Eng'g Co., 265 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1959); Sun Publishing Co. v. Walling, 140 F.2d 445 (6th
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 728 (1944); Smith v. Porter, 143 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1944); Walling
v. Yeakley, 140 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1944); Wirtz v. Patelos Door Corp., 280 F. Supp. 212 (E.D.N.C.
1968).
36. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-3 (1993); see also Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611, 613
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 298 (1992); McDonnell v. City of Omaha, 999 F.2d 293, 294
(8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1188 (1994); Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 484
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068 (1991); Shockley v. City of Newport News, 997 F.2d 18,
21-22 (4th Cir. 1993); Kinney v. District of Columbia, 994 F.2d 6, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Yourman v.
Dinkins, 826 F. Supp. 736, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
37. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1-3 (1993).
38. Id. §§ 541.1(0, 541.2(e)(1), 541.3(e). In addition to being paid on a salary basis, these em-
ployees must receive a certain minimum salary each week to qualify for the exemption. However, the
salary floor requirement no longer functions as a test for exempt status because it is too low. Accord-
ing to the regulations, professional employees must earn $170 per week and administrative or executive
employees must earn $155 per week to qualify for the exemption. Id. These salary floors have not
kept pace with the times. Current minimum wage is $4.25 per hour which amounts to a weekly salary
of $170. Hence, any minimum wage employee earns enough to meet the salary floor requirement. The
salary floor test for professional, executive or administrative status is obsolete as written. The contin-
ued existence of this obsolete portion of the exemption test is an indication that the regulations need
modernization.
39. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974); McDonnell, 999 F.2d at
296; Abshire, 908 F.2d at 484; Brock v. Claridge Hotel and Casino, 846 F.2d 180, 183 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, sub nom. Claridge Hotel and Casino v. McLaughlin, 488 U.S. 925 (1988).
40. See Shockley, 997 F.2d at 21.
41. See Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959); Arnold v. Ben
Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960) (the overtime exemption is limited to those employees who
are "plainly and unmistakably within [its] terms and spirit"); McDonnell, 999 F.2d at 295; Malcolm
Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d at 614; Yourman, 826 F. Supp. at 740; Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.
Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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lieved that these employees have some control over their hours.4 ' They have the re-
sponsibility of determining which tasks require their attention and how much time they
will devote to the task."3 Exempt employees have the discretion to manage their time
and activities." They do not get paid according to the number of hours they log. "A
salaried employee is compensated not for the amount of time spent on the job, but
rather for the general value of services performed. '45 The workweek of a professional
may vary from week to week, a slow week may be followed by a period of intense
work.
Salary is a mark of executive status because the salaried employee must decide for
himself the number of hours to devote to a particular task. In other words, the
salaried employee decides for himself how much a particular task is worth, mea-
sured in the number of hours he devotes to it. With regards to hourly employees, it
is the employer who decides the worth of a particular task, when he determines the
amount to pay the employee performing it. Paying an employee by the hour affords
that employee little of the latitude the salary requirement recognizes.'
B. The Salary Basis Test
According to the DOL regulations, an employee is paid on a salary basis if:
he regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a prede-
termined amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount is not
subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work
performed.47
Thus, to retain their salaried status, employees must be paid their full weekly salary in
any week in which work is performed, regardless of the number of days or hours the
employee actually worked.' However, a salaried employee need not be paid for any
week in which he performs no work at all.49 The practical effect of the salary basis
test is that an exempt employee is not entitled to overtime when he works more than
forty hours per week and the employer is not allowed to dock his pay when he works
less than forty hours per week.
The regulations do carve out some exceptions to the no pay-docking rule. The
employer is allowed to make deductions from an employee's pay for absences of a day
or more for personal reasons' or for sickness or disability, when such deductions are
made in accordance with a bona fide plan." In addition, the regulations permit deduc-
tions from pay for any length of time for penalties and disciplinary purposes which are
42. See Zalusky, supra note 33.
43. See Gustafson v. Nichols, No. 76-0009-Civ-6, 1979 WL 2027, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 2, 1979).
44. See Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11.
45. Abshire, 908 F.2d at 486.
46. Brock, 846 F.2d at 184 (footnote omitted).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (1993). Administrative and professional employees may be paid on a
fee basis and still qualify for this exemption. Id. §§ 541.2(e)(1). 541.3(e). This interpretation of the
salary basis test has been in effect since 1954. See 19 Fed. Reg. 4405 (1954).
48. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a); see also McDonnell v. City of Omaha, 999 F.2d 293, 294-95
(8th Cir. 1993). cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1188 (1994); Atlanta Professional Firefighters Union, Local
134 v. City of Atlanta, 920 F.2d 800, 805 (11th Cir. 1991).
49. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).
50. See id. § 541.118(a)(2).
51. See id. § 541.118(a)(3).
[Vol. 21:49
Pay-Docking
imposed for major safety violations. 2 However, an employer loses the benefit of the
exemption if the employee's pay is docked for absences caused by the employer, or by
the operating requirements of the business, jury duty, attendance as a witness in court,
temporary military leave, or for personal absences less than a full day.53
The regulation excludes from the exemption employees who are subject to partial
day pay-docking. "An employee who can be docked pay for missing a fraction of a
workday must be considered an hourly, rather than a salaried, employee."' Docking
an employee for partial day absences will convert an otherwise salaried employee to an
hourly employee who will be entitled to the payment of overtime. This conversion not
only forces the employer to compensate the employee for future overtime, but the
employee is eligible for back overtime for the preceding two years or, in the case of
willful violations, for the preceding three years, if it is determined that the employer
enjoyed the power of partial day pay-docking during that period.55 The partial day
pay-docking prohibition has recently come under close scrutiny by both the judiciary
and the DOL.
C. Private Litigation Over the Salary Basis Test
The two prong test for exemption from the FLSA's overtime provisions has been
in place since 1938.56 'The salary requirement has been an integral part of the 541
regulations since 1940.""7 The current regulatory interpretation of the salary basis test
including the partial day pay-docking prohibition has been in effect since 1954.8
However, the application of the salary basis test has only been the subject of extensive
litigation in the last five years. Prior to the inclusion of public sector employees, the
DOL was lax in its enforcement of this feature of the FLSA and there were few cases
brought for violation of the salary basis test. The extension of the FLSA to public
sector employees in 1985 focused the DOL's attention on the issue and triggered a
more active and rigorous enforcement of its provisions against private and public sec-
tor employers alike. The judiciary's recent attempts to interpret the salary basis test
52. See id. § 541.118(a)(5).
53. See id. §§ 541.118(a)(1) & (4). However, the DOL has issued regulations that allow employ-
ers to dock their employee's pay for partial day absences that are taken in accordance with the FMLA
without losing their professional, administrative or executive employee exemption. See id. § 825.206(a)
(1993). The DOL regulations are explicit that only when the leave qualifies as FMLA leave can the
employer dock pay without losing the exemption; in all other circumstances, the employer is forbidden
from making partial day deductions if it wishes to maintain the exempt status of its employees. See
id. § 825.206(b) (1993). The DOL took this position in response to the Congressional enactment of
the FMLA in 1993. The FMLA itself made no distinction between exempt and non-exempt employees.
Although the DOL has chosen to allow the salary of exempt employees to be docked for the limited
purposes enumerated in the FMLA without losing their exempt status, Congress did not explicitly
require such a result. It is possible to read the statute as requiring employers to grant their employees
FMLA leave but not allowing them to dock for partial day absences without forfeiting exempt status.
It could be that employers can dock for these partial day absences, but they do so at the expense of
their exemption. It seems that this interpretation would be more consistent with the notion of salary
status. Unfortunately, the DOL did not interpret the statute this way.
54. Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611, 615 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
298 (1992).
55. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1992).
56. The existing regulatory interpretation of the salary basis test has been in effect since 1954.
See 19 Fed. Reg. 4405 (1954).
57. 57 Fed. Reg. 37,666 (1992).
58. See 19 Fed. Reg. 4405 (1954).
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have resulted in great confusion in the law, and the circuits have taken contradictory
positions on which pay practices defeat salaried status.59 The unsettled nature of the
law has left employers exposed to potentially enormous and generally unexpected
liability for back overtime for employees who would have been exempt except for the
court's recent interpretations that certain long standing pay policies may now fail the
salary basis test. Examples of such conflicting interpretations include: (1) whether the
employee's pay must actually be docked before he loses his salaried status or whether
the mere possibility of a deduction is sufficient to fail the salary basis test; (2) whether
employers can dock their employees' accrued vacation or compensatory time for par-
tial day absences; and (3) when, if ever, the "window of correction" applies to relieve
a company from inadvertent violations. The circuits are split in their interpretation of
these and other issues' regarding an employee's salaried status, leaving employers
without guidance as to the legitimacy of their pay and leave policies. "This area of the
law is currently churning, and federal courts issue often contradictory opinions on a
daily basis."'" These issues are important to employers because if, for instance, the
mere possibility of a partial day deduction defeats salaried status, then any employer
policy authorizing a prohibited deduction would cause the conversion of the
employer's entire exempt labor force from salaried to hourly. No actual deduction
would ever have to occur, just subjecting the employees to the policy would defeat
their salaried status, and entitle them to past and future overtime. Such liability has the
potential to cripple unsuspecting businesses.
1. Are Actual Deductions from Pay Required Before an Otherwise Exempt
Employee is Considered Hourly?
The DOL regulations state that if an employee's pay is "subject to reduction" for
partial day absences then the employee is not exempt because he fails the salary basis
test.62 This language indicates that any policy which could result in improper deduc-
tions from the employee's pay would defeat exempt status. Yet, the circuits vary on
whether an "actual" deduction is necessary before an employee will be converted from
salaried to hourly. The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits
have held that the mere possibility that an employee's pay could be docked for partial
day absences is sufficient to convert a salaried employee to hourly.63 These courts
59. This article suggests that the conflicting judicial opinions are to a large extent the result of
the struggle the courts have had in enforcing the FLSA against state and local governments. In an
attempt to-insulate public sector employers from potentially devastating liability if the court were to
find them in violation of the provisions of the exemption, the courts have attempted to find ways for
government defendants to escape liability at every turn.
60. For a detailed analysis of the conflicting court opinions over whether a salaried employee can
receive overtime or bonuses for working long hours, see McDonnell v. City of Omaha, 999 F.2d 293,
296-98 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1188 (1994). See also Michigan Ass'n of Governmen-
tal Employees v. Michigan Dep't of Correction, 992 F.2d 82, 84 (6th Cir. 1993); Klein v. Rush-Pres-
byterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 990 F.2d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 1993).
61. Yourman v. Dinkins, 826 F. Supp. 736, 748 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Pautlitz v. City of
Naperville, 781 F. Supp. 1368, 1374 (N.D. Ill. 1992)).
62. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).
63. See, e.g., Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611, 617 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 298 (1992); Yourman, 826 F. Supp. at 744; Michigan Ass'n of Governmental Employees, 992
F.2d at 86 (the threat of potential deductions destroy the salary basis); Klein, 990 F.2d at 279 (the
fact that a pay deduction could be made for an impermissible reason is enough to deny exempt status
regardless of whether an actual deduction occurred); Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d at 483, 483
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have held that no actual deduction is necessary because the language of the DOL regu-
lation focuses on whether an employee's pay can be docked, not whether it has been
docked.' Further support for the proposition that an actual deduction is not necessary
to defeat salaried status comes from the DOL's explicit refusal at the time it modified
the applicability of the salary basis test to public employees, to alter the regulations to
require an actual deduction before finding salary status defeated.'
Opposing this interpretation of the DOL regulations, the Fifth, Eighth, and Elev-
enth Circuits have held that an "actual" deduction for a partial day absence must occur
before the employee's exempt status is lost.' These courts have claimed that they
have not disregarded the DOL regulations, they have just construed them in a different
manner.67 "We, however, do not read the 'subject to' language of the regulation to
mean that a 'possible' or 'contingent' reduction in salary automatically means that pay
is 'subject to reduction,' and in violation of the salary basis test."" One circuit even
has held that an occasional prohibited deduction from compensation would not cause
an employee to lose his exempt status." In reliance on a DOL Opinion Letter, some
courts have held that partial day deductions from the pay of public employees would
have to be regular and recurring before an employer would lose the ability to claim the
exemption because its employee failed the salary basis test.7 These courts have con-
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068 (1991); Kinney v. District of Columbia, 994 F.2d 6, 11
(D.C. Cir. 1993). In addition, several district courts in other circuits have agreed that the possibility of
partial day pay deductions defeat exempt status. See Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F. Supp.
1023, 1025 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Hawks v. City of Newport News, 707 F. Supp. 212, 215 (E.D. Va.
1988); Persons v. City of Gresham, 704 F. Supp. 191, 194 (D. Or. 1988); Knecht v. City of Redw-d
City, 683 F. Supp. 1307, 1311 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Lacey v. Indiana State Police Dep't, 810 F. Supp.
244, 248 n.1 (S.D. Ind. 1992); Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego,
784 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (S.D. Cal. 1992). Many of the cases cited pertain to public employees. Prior
to the issuance of DOL regulation 29 C.F.R. § 541.5d in 1992, private and public employees were
treated identically for purposes of the salary basis test. See infra notes 116-117 and accompanying
text.
64. The judiciary is bound to follow the DOL regulations as it would a statute because Congress
expressly authorized the DOL to issue regulations implementing the FLSA. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
65. See 57 Fed. Reg. 37,673 (1992).
66. See, e.g., York v. City of Wichita Falls, 944 F.2d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 1991) (salaried execu-
tive employees do not lose their exempt status unless an actual deduction of their pay occurred);
McDonnell v. City of Omaha, 999 F.2d 293, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1188
(1994); Atlanta Professional Firefighters Union, Local 134 v. City of Atlanta, 920 F.2d 800, 805 (1lth
Cir. 1991) (an employee does not lose his exempt status absent proof that the employee incurred actu-
al deductions in his pay). Some district courts have agreed that the mere possibility that an employee's
pay could be docked for a partial day absence is insufficient to defeat exempt status. See, e.g.,
Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F. Supp. 1548, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (only those employees who
have suffered actual reductions in pay for partial day absences lose their exempt status).
67. The DOL regulations are valid and binding upon the courts and must be given the force and
effect of law. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. However, the courts may, as these courts
have, differ in their interpretation and application of the regulations. See McDonnell, 999 F.2d at 297.
68. McDonnell, 999 F.2d at 297.
69. See International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.
Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D. Va. 1989), afftd, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990). See also Harris v. District of
Columbia, 709 F. Supp. 238, 241 (D.D.C. 1989) and District of Columbia Nurses' Ass'n v. District of
Columbia, No. C.A. 87-1675, 1988 WL 156191, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 1988), which embraced the
same view; the latter, however, no longer has force in light of the District of Columbia's ruling in
Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11, that even potential pay-docking converts the employees to non-salary status.
70. See Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter, Jan. 15, 1986, reprinted
in [6A Wages & Hours Manual] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 99:5043 (1993). This Opinion Letter stated
that an occasional improper deduction would only cause the loss of the exemption in the workweek
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 21:49
cluded that granting windfalls of back overtime to employees who never experienced
any actual deductions in pay would be fundamentally unfair and inequitable. Further
compounding this confusion, the DOL has suggested that occasional partial day pay-
docking of public employees7 only resulted in loss of exempt status for those em-
ployees who were actually docked and it only resulted in loss of exempt status for the
week in which the employees were actually docked. The employees' exempt status
would remain intact for all preceding and subsequent workweeks.,"
2. Can Employers Dock an Exempt Employee's Accrued Vacation or Sick Leave
for Partial Day Absences Without Defeating Exempt Status?
As the foregoing indicates, the courts all agree that when a private employee's
pay is actually docked for a partial day absence, the employee is not exempt from the
FLSA overtime provision because he does not meet the requirements of the salary
basis test. However, the law is less clear concerning the application of the same rule to
deductions from an employee's accrued vacation or sick leave for partial day absences.
Such deductions would reduce the employee's available leave, but would not reduce
his actual pay. In effect, the issue becomes whether the vacation and sick leave, which
is part of an employee's compensation package, should be treated the same as his pay
for partial day pay-docking purposes.
The regulations state that the employee's "compensation" cannot be subject to
reduction.73 Since the regulations do not define compensation, the courts are left to
determine whether the DOL intended to include vacation and sick leave. If the vaca-
tion and sick leave is considered part of the employee's predetermined compensation,
then it would follow that deductions from an employee's leave, like deductions from
his pay would be prohibited. Moreover, the very fact that Congress is considering
amendments to the FLSA which would allow partial day deductions from an
when the deduction is made. However, if the improper deductions are regular and recurring then the
exemption should be denied in all workweeks because the employee would not be paid on a salary
basis. Id. See also Hawks, 707 F. Supp. at 214; Knecht, 683 F. Supp. at 1311. The courts who op-
pose this view and who claim that the possibility of improper deductions is sufficient to lose exempt
status have argued that this Opinion Letter is being misinterpreted, that the frequency of actual deduc-
tions is immaterial when the employer has a policy that permits improper deductions. See Abshire, 908
F.2d at 488; Yourman v. Dinkins, 826 F. Supp. 736, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Knecht, 683 F. Supp. at
1311. These courts also suggest that even if the Opinion Letter is being interpreted correctly by those
who require regular and recurring deductions before exempt status is lost, they are not bound to follow
the Opinion Letter because it cannot override the express provisions of the DOL regulations. See
Abshire, 908 F.2d at 488; Yourman, 826 F. Supp. at 743.
71. It is important to keep in mind that some of these cases and Opinion Letters were decided
and promulgated before the issuance of 29 C.F.R. § 541.5d which permits partial day pay-docking for
public employees. However, private employers remain prohibited from docking the compensation of
their employees for partial day absences.
72. See 57 Fed. Reg. 37,669 (1992) (citing Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Opin-
ion Letter, Jan. 15, 1986, reprinted in [6A Wages & Hours Manual] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 99:5043
(1993)); Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter, July 17, 1987, reprinted in
[6A Wages & Hours Manual] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 99:5173 (1993). See also McDonnell, 999 F.2d at
297 (citing Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter, Jan. 9, 1987 (exemption
will not be denied for otherwise exempt public employees whose pay is docked for short absences
because the employee has exhausted his available leave)). It is plausible that these decisions by the
DOL were an attempt to insulate public employers, such as state and local governments, from the
potentially enormous liability they could face if the regulations regarding the salary basis test were
strictly interpreted.
73. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).
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employee's accumulated leave without jeopardizing the employer's exemption suggests
that this protection does not presently exist.74 Furthermore, the Second and Seventh
Circuits, as well as several district courts in other jurisdictions, have held that an em-
ployee will not be salaried under the FLSA if his employer deducts his accrued leave
to cover partial day absences.75 These courts have held that docking an employee's
leave is tantamount to docking his compensation because fringe benefits are an integral
part of an employee's compensation. "Like docking base pay, docking compensatory
time and accrued leave indicates non-salaried status because the employee's compensa-
tion is reduced on account of the amount of work done."'76
On the other hand, the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, as well as a few
district courts, have disagreed. These courts have held that deducting accrued leave for
partial day absences does not convert otherwise salaried employees to hourly.77
"While personal leave, sick leave and/or compensatory time may be part of an
employee's compensation package, it does not constitute salary."78 These courts relied
on a DOL Opinion Letter which concluded that a salaried employee does not lose his
exempt status when his employer makes deductions from his accrued leave for partial
day absences.79 In 1992, the DOL reaffirmed the view that a deduction in accrued
leave is not the same as a deduction in pay under the salary basis test.e It stated, "[i]t
is the Department's position that an employer can require an employee to substitute
paid leave for absences of less than a day without losing the exemption for that week
because, in such circumstances, the employee does not experience a deduction from
pay.'"' Yet, despite this seemingly clear language from the DOL, many courts contin-
ue to reach the opposite conclusion. These courts reason that if the regulation includes
vacation, then a mere Letter Ruling that is contrary has no legal effect.
3. When Does the "Window of Correction" Apply to Relieve a Company of the
Consequences of an Inadvertent Violation of the Salary Basis Test?
The DOL regulations state:
[t]he effect of making a deduction which is not permitted under these interpreta-
tions will depend upon the facts in the particular case .... [W]here a deduction
74. See H.R. 1309, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1354, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
75. See, e.g., Martin v. Malcolm Pimie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611, 615 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 298 (1992); Klein v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 990 F.2d 279, 284 (7th Cir.
1993); Abshire, 908 F.2d at 487 n.3; Benzler v. State of Nevada, 804 F. Supp. 1303, 1306 (D. Nev.
1992); Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 784 F. Supp. 1503, 1510
(S.D. Cal. 1992); Aaron v. Wichita, 797 F. Supp. 898, 907 (D. Kan. 1992); Thomas v. County of
Fairfax, 758 F. Supp. 353, 357 n.8 (E.D. Va. 1991); Banks v. City of North Little Rock, 708 F.
Supp. 1023, 1024 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Knecht, 683 F. Supp. at 1311-12.
76. Benzler, 804 F. Supp. at 1306.
77. See Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1994); International Ass'n of
Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F. Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D. Va. 1989),
affid, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990); Hartman v. Arlington County, 720 F. Supp. 1227, afftd, 903 F.2d
290 (4th Cir. 1990); York v. City of Wichita Falls, 912 F.2d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 1991); McDonnell,
999 F.2d at 295-97; Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F. Supp. 1548, 1555-56 (S.D. Fla. 1993);
Keller v. City of Columbus, 778 F. Supp. 1480, 1486 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
78. Fire Fighters Local 2141, 720 F. Supp. at 1232.
79. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter, July 17, 1987, reprinted in
[6A Wages & Hours Manual] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 99:5173 (1993).
80. 57 Fed. Reg. 37,666, 37,676 (1992).
81. Id.
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not permitted by these interpretations is inadvertent, or is made for reasons other
than lack of work, the exemption will not be considered to have been lost if the
employer reimburses the employee for such deductions and promises to comply in
the future."
This regulation created what has become known as a "window of correction." It allows
an employer who improperly makes partial day pay deductions to restore the
employee's exempt status by reimbursing the employee and promising to comply with
the salary basis test in the future.83 Courts have held that even when the partial day
pay deductions were made pursuant to a long standing written leave policy the "win-
dow of correction" can still apply." One court held that even though the employer
did not reimburse the employees who had suffered the improper deductions until a
lawsuit was brought against him, he could still use the "window of correction" to
escape liability."
Even though the regulation indicates that an improper deduction does not auto-
matically trigger a loss of the exemption, many courts have been interpreting the salary
basis test as an iron clad rule, where even the possibility of an improper deduction
causes the loss of exempt status.8 6 These courts have given the "window of correc-
tion" very limited applicability.
Extensive debate regarding the "window of correction" has centered around
whether the regulation should be read disjunctively." The language of the regulation
allows employers who make improper deductions to correct their mistakes when the
deduction "is inadvertent, or is made for reasons other than lack of work."88 A dis-
82. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(6).
83. See, e.g., Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F. Supp. 1548, 1556-57 (S.D. Fla. 1993);
Simmons v. City of Fort Worth, 805 F. Supp. 419, 424 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Keller v. City of Colum-
bus, 778 F. Supp. 1480, 1486 (S.D. Ind. 1991); Hartman v. Arlington County, 720 F. Supp. 1227,
1230 (E.D. Va. 1989), affd, 903 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1990); Thomas v. County of Fairfax, 758 F.
Supp. 353, 357 (E.D. Va. 1991); Chadwick v. Norfolk, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1407, 1408
(E.D. Va. 1988) (window of correction applicable despite policy that allowed for improper deductions);
Harkins v. City of Chesapeake, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1399, 1400-03 (E.D. Va. 1988).
84. See, e.g., Kuchinskas, 840 F. Supp. at 1556-57 ("window of correction" available despite three
year written policy of making unauthorized deductions); Hartman, 720 F. Supp. at 1229-30 ("window
of correction" is applicable despite written pay policy which was in effect for two years and ten
months which allowed improper pay deductions); Thomas, 758 F. Supp. at 357 ("window of correc-
tion" is applicable despite written pay policy which was in effect for two years which docked lieuten-
ants pay for partial day absences); Simmons, 805 F. Supp. at 424-25 ("window of correction" was
applicable despite four year pay policy which made improper deductions to over 20% of the exempt
employees); Keller, 778 F. Supp. at 1487 ("window of correction" applicable despite three year policy
making unauthorized deductions); International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City
of Alexandria, 720 F. Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D. Va. 1989), affd, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990) (the
City properly qualified for the "window of correction" because it revised its policy of making improp-
er partial day deductions and promised to comply in the future).
85. See Keller, 778 F. Supp. at 1487. But see Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 102 v. Coun-
ty of San Diego, 784 F. Supp. 1503, 1511-12 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (the "window of correction" is not
available after litigation has begun because there would be no incentive to comply with the law).
86. See, e.g., Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1068 (1991) (the "window of correction" is only applicable to an employer who makes one im-
proper deduction and then corrects it); Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611, 616 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 298 (1992); Klein v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 990
F.2d 279, 288 (7th Cir. 1993) (when salary deductions are made pursuant to the employer's written
policy, they are not inadvertent).
87. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13-15, Malcolm.Pirnie (No. 91-1748), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 298 (1992).
88. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(6) (emphasis added).
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junctive reading of the regulation would allow employers who deliberately made im-
proper deductions for reasons other than lack of work to use the "window of correc-
tion" and escape the penalty imposed by the statute for non-compliance.
Some courts have agreed that the plain language of the regulation requires that it
be read disjunctively.89 These courts have held that when regulations are written
disjunctively, meeting any one of the terms within the provision will be sufficient.'
Whether the policy allowing hourly deductions was inadvertent need not be consid-
ered. The regulation provides that the 'window of correction' option applies when a
deduction is inadvertent 'or is made for reasons other than work.' Thus, if a policy
allowed a deduction 'for reasons other than lack of work' then the 'window of
correction' is open regardless of whether the error was inadvertent."
In its application to the Supreme Court for Certiorari, Malcolm Pirnie, argued that "[i]t
is a hornbook rule of construction that every word in a regulation is deemed to have
meaning .... The regulation plainly allows the use of the "window of correction" for
reasons other than 'inadvertence,' otherwise the regulation would not use the term
'or'.,' Supporters of a disjunctive reading of the "window of correction" believe that
a good faith requirement should be read into the regulation.93 A non-disjunctive read-
ing of the regulation would so narrow the applicability of the provision that it would
be virtually useless. In addition, a non-disjunctive reading would discourage businesses
from correcting policies which allow for improper deductions (even when no actual
deductions have occurred) because of the catastrophic consequences of admitting to
and confronting a salary basis test violation.
On the other hand, some other courts believe that the regulation should be read
conjunctively, not disjunctively.' These courts have concluded that a better reading of
the regulation is that both conditions, inadvertence and for reasons other than lack of
work, must be met before an employer can avail itself of the "window of correc-
tion."95 They point out that the regulation also says that the effect of an improper de-
89. See, e.g., Kuchinskas, 840 F. Supp. at 1557; Keller, 778 F. Supp. at 1487; Brown v. Eckerd
Drugs, Inc., 24 Wage & Hour (BNA) 114, 115 (M.D.N.C. 1979); Martin v. Pierce Processing, Inc.,
No. C-1-89-15, slip op. at 9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 1992).
90. See George Lawley & Son Corp. v. South, 140 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 746 (1945); Hodgson v. Prophet Co., 472 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1973) (use of the word "or" in
the FLSA indicates that Congress intended alternatives); cf. Walling v. Morris, 155 F.2d 832 (6th Cir.
1946), cert. granted, 330 U.S. 817, vacated sub nom, Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422 (1947) (when
the regulations are written in the conjunctive an employer is required to meet all of the terms in order
to qualify); Smith v. Porter, 143 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1944).
91. Keller, 778 F. Supp. at 1487 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
92. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Malcolm Pirnie, (No. 91-1748), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
298 (1992).
93. See, e.g., id. at 14 n.10.
94. See, e.g., Klein v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 990 F.2d 279, 287 (7th Cir.
1993) (employer was not entitled to use the window of correction because the improper deductions
were not inadvertent, despite the fact that they were made for reasons other than lack of work); Dole
v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 899, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Martin v. Malcolm
Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 298 (1992); Pautlitz v. City of
Naperville, 781 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (N.D. I11. 1992); Brief for the Respondent, Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 9, Malcolm Pirnie, (no. 91-1748), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 298 (1992).
95. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 784 F. Supp. 1503, 1511-
12 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (the window of correction is not available to the County because they did not
prove that the deductions were inadvertent).
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duction "will depend on the facts of the case."" It would be unfair to allow employ-
ers to cure all deliberate improper deductions other than those made for lack of
work.' Allowing employers who did not meet the requirements of the salary basis
test to preserve the exemption when they made deliberate improper deductions would
undermine the very effectiveness of the FLSA.9 s
D. Public vs. Private Employees
As originally enacted in 1938, the FLSA did not apply to public sector employ-
ees." "The history of the FLSA as applied to state and local government employees
involves a number of actions by Congress, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), and
the U.S. Supreme Court since 19 6 6 .'"° The first attempt by Congress to expand the
protections afforded by the FLSA to public employees came in 1966. These amend-
ments extended the statute's minimum wage and overtime provisions to a limited
group of public sector employees.' In 1968, the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of applying the FLSA to these limited public sector employers." In 1974,
Congress amended the definition of "employer" to include all public employers, there-
by extending FLSA coverage to virtually all federal, state and local government em-
ployees. 3 However, in 1976 the Court held that it was unconstitutional to apply the
FLSA to state and local government employees who were engaged in traditional gov-
ernment activities.?" In 1985, the Court reversed its earlier decision and held that
Congress is within its power to extend FLSA coverage to public employees." The
Court held that subjecting public sector employees to the overtime and minimum wage
requirements of the FLSA was not unconstitutional and did not destroy state sovereign-
ty. "1 After this decision, Congress amended the FLSA to address the particular con-
cerns of state and local government employers and to shield these employers from
96. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(6).
97. See Brief for the Respondent, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Malcolm Pirnie, (no. 91-
1748), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 298 (1992).
98. See Klein, 990 F.2d at 287.
99. See S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620,
1625 [hereinafter FLSA Amendments of 1961]; 57 Fed. Reg. 37,666 (1992); S. REP. No. 159, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 651, 652 [hereinafter FLSA Amendments of
1985].
100. FLSA Amendments of 1985, supra note 99, at 4.
101. See S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002,
3003. The public sector employees which were included in the Act's coverage included: state and local
transit company employees, state and local hospital employees, employees of state and local govern-
ment agencies, government institutions of higher education, and federal government employees. See id.
at 3006-08. See also H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2811, 2816.
102. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (the Commerce Clause provides a constitutional basis
for Congress to extend coverage under the FLSA to state and local governments).
103. See Fair Labor Standard Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 55, 59-60
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1993)). See also H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2812-13, 2837-38. However, elected officials and
their staffs remain exempt from the FLSA. See Fair Labor Standard Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 55, 59-60 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1993)).
104. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (the Commerce Clause does not
empower Congress to enforce the FLSA minimum wage and overtime provisions against states whose
employees are engaged in traditional government functions), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonia Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
105. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
106. Id.
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liability for one year while they brought their pay policies into compliance with the
FLSA.' ° These amendments did not address the application of the professional, ex-
ecutive, or administrative exemption to public employees.
The DOL quickly recognized the problems in applying the salary basis test to
state and local government employees. The current regulatory interpretation of the
salary basis test including the no partial day pay-docking rule was developed in 1954
to be consistent with the pay practices that were prevalent in the private sector."°
There was no consideration of the prevalent pay practices in state and local govern-
ments at that time because public employers were excluded from the FLSA's cover-
age."° When the FLSA was extended to public sector employees, the DOL discov-
ered that the FLSA pay-docking provisions were inconsistent with most state and local
government pay policies. These state and local government pay practices had evolved
over the years in compliance with statutes and ordinances that had been in place long
before FLSA coverage was extended to public employees." "Such pay systems are
generally premised on a concept derived from principles of public accountability that
government employees should not be paid for time not worked due to the need to be
accountable to the taxpayers for the expenditure of public funds.' In 1985, the pay
policies of most public employers required all employees to use accrued leave or to
incur a reduction in their pay for any absence from work."' The DOL recognized
that it would be difficult for state and local governments to change these widespread,
long-standing pay policies and, in 1987, it adopted a non-enforcement policy with
respect to public employers while it considered proposed changes to the salary basis
test."' This non-enforcement policy permitted public employers to dock their em-
ployees for partial day absences without forfeiting their exempt status as long as their
pay policy was adopted to comply with an existing state or local law." 4 Hence, pub-
lic employers could dock their salaried employees for partial day absences without los-
ing the FLSA exemption. However, the DOL explicitly stated that its non-enforcement
policy did not affect the rights of public employees to file lawsuits against their em-
ployers for violating the FLSA." 5
In 1992, the DOL issued regulation section .541.5d that expressly permits public
sector employers to dock an exempt employee for partial day absences without jeopar-
dizing the employer's exemption."6 The regulation is limited to public sector em-
ployers and does not apply to their private sector counterparts. Section 541.5d does not
107. See S. REP. No. 159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 651, 655-
56. The 1985 amendments authorized state and local governments to continue to provide their employ-
ees with compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay for hours in excess of forty per week. See Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787, 787-88 (1985) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1993)).
108. See 57 Fed. Reg. 37,666 (1992).
109. Id. See also McDonnell v. City of Omaha, 999 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1188 (1994).
110. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 37,667 (1992).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Exemptions From Minimum Wage and Overtime Compensation Requirements of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act; Public Sector Employers, 57 Fed. Reg. 37,666 (1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 541).
114. Id. at 37,668.
115. Id.
116. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.5d (1993).
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entirely eliminate the salary basis test for public employers. The regulation provides
that public employers whose employees meet all of the requirements for exempt status
except for the no partial day pay-docking prohibition, still qualify for the exemption
despite government policies that permit an employee's accumulated leave or base pay
to be docked for partial day absences." 7 The no pay-docking rule was eliminated for
public sector employers because of state laws which prohibit state and local govern-
ments from paying their employees for hours not actually worked. There is no similar
statutory provision that applies to private sector employees, therefore, they continue to
be bound by the salary basis test as it appears in the DOL regulations. When section
541.5d was issued, the DOL considered and rejected proposals and comments that
private sector employers should likewise be able to dock their employees for such
absences. The DOL was explicit in its declaration that public sector pay systems have
to be analyzed differently from their private sector counterparts." 8 The DOL found
that its regulations, as written, were not appropriate for application to state and local
government employers because they deprived them of the opportunity to benefit from
the exemption." 9
The DOL announced two rationales for its new regulation. First, it recognized
that public employees are paid pursuant to pay systems which were established in
compliance with laws based on public accountability."2 It found a strong government
interest in the principle of public accountability which precludes paying public employ-
ees for time not worked because governments are accountable to their taxpayers for
expenditures of public funds, including employees' salaries.'.. "Public accountability
embodies the concept that elected officials and public agencies are held to a higher
level of responsibility under the public trust that demands effective and efficient use of
public funds in order to serve the public interest."'" The DOL concluded that few
public employers would ever be able to avail themselves of the professional, executive
or administrative exemption for their employees due to the government's duty of ac-
countability owed to its citizens without the new regulation.
Second, the DOL concluded that state and local governments would be crippled
by the potential liability for back pay that would be sought by otherwise exempt em-
ployees who would be deemed hourly solely because of the pay policy requiring partial
day deductions.
Because of concerns that the unexpected liabilities threatened to seriously impair
the fiscal integrity of many state and local governmental agencies, and would
disrupt widespread, long-standing pay practices that had been designed to serve the
public trust, the Department undertook a separate rulemaking on the specific issue
of application of the 'salary basis' rule to public sector employees.'
However, the new regulation, section 541.5d, does not relieve public employers of
their potential liability for back overtime pay for improper deductions prior to its issu-
ance because the FLSA does not authorize retroactive rulemaking.' 4
117. See 57 Fed. Reg. 37,671 (1992).
118. Id. at 37,670.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 37,667.
122. Id. at 37,676.
123. Id. at 37,670.
124. See generally Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (statutory grant of
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IV. THE WORKPLACE LEAVE FAIRNESS ACT
The WLFA was introduced on March 11, 1993, in the House of Representa-
tives." It sought to amend the FLSA to allow all employers to make partial day pay
deductions from an employee's accumulated leave or pay without jeopardizing the
employee's exempt status.' The bill would override the DOL regulations and re-
quire the DOL to change the salary basis test. It would allow private sector employers
to reduce their employees' accrued leave or dock their pay for partial day absences,
but would leave intact all of the other requirements of the salary basis test. In effect, it
is just an extension of DOL regulation section 541.5d to private employers.
A companion Senate bill, also entitled the WLFA, was introduced on August 4,
1993.2 It would result in a more extensive change in the law. In addition to extend-
ing section 541.5d to private employers, it would permit employers to establish regular
employee working hours, require employees to record the number of hours worked,
and allow employers to suspend employees without pay for any disciplinary rea-
sons."2 If passed, this bill would effectively eliminate the salary basis test. Both bills
indicate that they are to apply retroactively, in order to relieve employers of any liabil-
ity for past instances of improper deductions."
A. The Alleged Purpose Behind These Bills
Proponents of the WLFA assert two general purposes for the bill: to respond to
the needs of modem families by increasing flexibility in the workplace, and to relieve
American businesses of the unfair and unexpected potential liability they face because
of the DOL's pay-docking rule. Proponents claim that the bill's primary purpose is to
increase flexibility in the workplace for the employee by reversing a DOL ruling.'
The [DOLl rule is a slap in the face of employers trying to provide flexibility to a
segment of their workforce. The rule is a serious inconvenience to salaried employ-
ees, who now must take a full day of unpaid leave even if personal obligations
only require a few hours away from work.'
Proponents of the bill claim that it allows employers to provide their workers with the
option of taking a partial day off for personal reasons. Representative Robert E.
Andrews, who introduced the bill in the House, claims that exempt employees are
currently prohibited from taking a partial day off from work. He interprets the existing
DOL pay-docking rule as, in effect, requiring exempt employees to either take a whole
day off or work a whole day.'32 He discusses the evolution of the modem workplace
demographics and concludes that the current interpretation of the salary basis test is
legislative rulemaking authority does not encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless
expressly granted by Congress). Since the FLSA does not expressly authorize the DOL to issue retro-
active rules or regulations, it is without this power. See 57 Fed. Reg. 37,678 (1992).
125. See H.R. 1309, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
126. Id.
127. See S. 1354, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
128. Id.
129. H.R. 1309 § 3; S. 1354 § 3.
130. See Andrews, supra note 5, at E622; Petri, supra note 5, at E616; Kilberg, supra note 5;
Kassebaum, supra note 5, at S10,381.
131. Pressler, supra note 5, at S10,383.
132. See Andrews, supra note 5, at E622.
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not family-friendly. For example, he believes that the rapid increase of women in the
workforce has created a need that the existing law does not meet. He claims that the
WLFA responds to this change in workplace demographics. 33
Likewise, Representative Thomas E. Petri, who joined Representative Andrews in
introducing the WLFA in the House, appeals to the need for more family-friendly
leave legislation." He claims that the WLFA is just an expansion of the FMLA.
Like his colleague, he believes that the current DOL policy prohibits employers from
having flexible leave policies for their salaried employees. He claims that the DOL
issued regulation section 541.5d because "[tihe Department knows that this policy does
not make sense. It has exempted its own employees and all other Federal workers from
the rule.'' 3 5
Senator Nancy Kassebaum, along with Senators Thad Cochran, James Jeffords,
and Larry Pressler introduced the WLFA in the Senate on August 4, 1993. Senator
Kassebaum believes that the FMLA is too narrow," and the WLFA is needed to
broaden the ability of employers to have family-friendly leave policies.'37 Senator
Pressler concurs, adding that the flexibility to take partial day unpaid leave is needed
because today's workforce is comprised of single parents or two working parent fami-
lies. 3 The bill's proponents claim that the current DOL prohibition against partial
day pay-docking has forced employers to require that their employees take a full day
of leave if they need to leave work during the day. 39 The proponents claim that the
WLFA is needed so that employers can have more flexible leave policies, and permit
their employees to take a partial day absence when needed.
The proponents of the bill also claim that the WLFA is needed to relieve busi-
nesses of the unexpected and unreasonable liability that they face because of the pay-
docking rule. Senator Kassebaum cites Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc.,"4 as an illus-
tration of the severity of the current DOL regulations and the devastating effects this
policy can have on a company." Malcolm Pimie was a 900 employee engineering
company which docked twenty-four employees a combined total of less than $3,300
133. Id.
134. See Petri, supra note 5, at E617.
135. Id.
136. It is interesting to note that Senator Kassebaum, who claims to be supporting the WLFA as
an expansion of the FMLA, was actually opposed to the FMLA. In fact, the Senator was one of only
four Senators on the Labor and Human Resources Committee who opposed the FMLA. See S. REP.
No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 50-53 (1993). Such a change in views would certainly leave this author
questioning the Senator's motives for supporting the WLFA if it really is an expansion of the FMLA.
However, the WLFA is not an expansion of the family friendly legislation as its proponents claim.
This article suggests that the bill's proponents are trying to ride on the coattails of the widely sup-
ported FMLA by claiming that the WLFA is consistent with the FMLA and hoping that no one will
notice that the WLFA is actually pro-employer legislation.
137. See Kassebaum, supra note 5, at S10,382. The Senator is concerned that the FMLA does not
apply to employers with less than fifty employees. In those cases the employers cannot grant partial
day unpaid leave to salaried employees who have family or medical emergencies. The WLFA would
create that option for compassionate employers. Id. While this article agrees that the scope of the
FMLA should be expanded, it does not believe that the WLFA would achieve this result.
138. See Pressler, supra note 5, at S10,382.
139. See, e.g., Andrews supra note 5, at E622; Petri, supra note 5, at E617; Pressler, supra note
5, at S!0,383; Kassebaum, supra note 5, at S10,382.
140. See Kassebaum, supra note 5, at SIO,382 (citing 949 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 298 (1992)).
141. See Kassebaum, supra note 5, at S1O,382.
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over a nineteen month period. The pay deductions were primarily for employees who
voluntarily accepted leave without pay, so that they could take off during the day for
personal reasons. When the company realized that its pay deductions violated the DOL
regulations, it immediately repaid the docked employees and changed its pay policy to
be consistent with the DOL regulations. However, the DOL still filed suit against
Malcolm Pimie. The court held that because the company had a written policy which
permitted partial day pay-docking from salaried employees, all of their employees,
even those who were never actually docked, were hourly and not salaried and were,
therefore, entitled to overtime. The result of this judgment was to entitle all the
company's employees to overtime compensation for the two years preceding the litiga-
tion. This amounted to Malcolm Pirnie owing $750,000 in back overtime to employees
who were already paid salaries between $40,000 and $70,000 annually. Needless to
say, companies like Malcolm Pimie are supporting the WLFA. Malcolm Pirnie's chair-
man, John Foster, stated, "[the WLFA] is not a pay-docking issue as some have report-
ed; it is a flexibility issue."'42 Foster also claimed that his company was "blindsided"
by the DOL's "new interpretation" of the FLSA. 43
Senator Kassebaum, like the bill's other supporters, claims that the bill is neces-
sary to relieve private sector employers from the potentially devastating liability they
face for having pay policies that violate the current DOL policy. Kassebaum supports
the WLFA's retroactive application "to relieve public and private employers from
liability for back pay who have had flexible leave policies, but have been unaware of
these Department of Labor rules."'"' Others, too, support the bill's retroactive appli-
cation to eliminate the $39 billion in potential liability for back overtime pay that
private employers would face for having flexible leave policies which permit their
employees to take unpaid partial day leave. 4
B. The Actual Effects of the Bill
If enacted, the WLFA would result in a windfall for employers, who would be
able to dock employees for their absences and would not have to compensate them for
their presence. Congress exempted professional, administrative, and executive employ-
ees from the FLSA's overtime provisions because these employees, unlike hourly
employees, are paid for the general value of their services, not for the number of hours
they work." Exempt employees are paid an amount that bears no relationship to the
number of hours worked in any particular week. 47 They do not punch a clock. To
qualify for the exemption from overtime, employers must pay these employees on a
salary basis. If the WLFA is enacted, it will essentially do away with the salary basis
test. Employers will be free to dock their employees if they have to leave for a few
hours during the day to take a child to the doctor, and they will have no obligation to
compensate them the next day when they stay late to finish up a project. Docking
employees for partial day absences is completely inconsistent with the notion of sala-
142. Kassebaum Move Applauded, Daily Lab. Rep. Current Dev. (BNA) No. 148, at A-4 (Aug. 4,
1993).
143. Id.
144. Kassebaum, supra note 5, at S10,382.
145. See Andrews, supra note 5, at E622; Petri, supra note 5, at E617; Pressler, supra note 5, at
S10,383.
146. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
147. See Thomas v. County of Fairfax, 758 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D. Va. 1991).
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fled status, and the FLSA in general. If enacted, the WLFA will undermine the goal of
the FLSA-to provide broad employment protection-by making the exemption from
overtime very easy to obtain. Since the WLFA effectively eliminates the salary basis
test, and the minimum salary floor test is so low that any minimum wage employee
would qualify,' 4' employers would only have to prove that their employees meet the
duties test to qualify for the exemption. This would greatly increase the number of
employees who qualify for the exemption and, therefore, do not receive the overtime
protections of the FLSA. The exemption would no longer be narrowly construed as
Congress intended. 149 As John Zalusky, Head of the Offices of Wages and Industrial
Relations, said in opposing the WLFA,
In short, the docking test says that when an employer claims employees are not
entitled to overtime protection because they are salaried and therefore exempt, it
cannot chisel by docking employees for short absences. To do so would be trying
to have it both ways. If this were allowed the Act's 40 hour week would become
meaningless .... Not only is the docking test an efficient ingredient in limiting
work to 40 hours per week, it is also fair. If a worker is expected to work long
hours in one period [without receiving overtime premiums] it is just plain wrong to
cut their pay when they need a few hours off.'"
The claims by proponents of the WLFA that it is designed to increase worker
flexibility and to respond to the needs of the modem workforce for family-friendly
legislation are unpersuasive. The bill's proponents are trying to ride on the coattails of
the much needed and well supported FMLA. The FMLA was enacted to protect the
worker's need to respond to family and medical emergencies. Although it applies
equally to workers across the economic spectrum, it was specifically designed to pro-
tect low wage workers.' The WLFA has no such purpose. The WLFA, unlike the
FMLA, benefits the employer, not the employee, and is limited in scope to profession-
al, executive and administrative employees. The DOL estimates that 22 million of the
115 million people in the civilian workforce are salaried.'
Instead of increasing employee benefits as the FMLA does, the WLFA benefits
the employer at the expense of the employee. The WLFA does not require employers
to allow their employees to take leave that they would not otherwise be entitled to,
quite the contrary, it allows employers to dock employees for something that they
already have.'53 It is important to remember that a salaried employee is not paid ac-
cording to the number of hours that they log. "A salaried employee is compensated not
for the amount of time spent on the job, but rather for the general value of services
148. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
150. Zalusky, supra note 33.
151. See S. REP. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1993). The DOL regulations clarify the
FMLA's application to salaried professional, administrative and executive employees under the FLSA.
The regulations permit employers to dock the pay of salaried employees for partial day absences made
in conjunction with the FMLA without losing their exempt status. The regulations indicate that this
pay-docking is only permitted for the those employees that qualify under the FMLA, and only for
those purposes enumerated in the Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.206 (1993).
152. See Frank Swoboda, Business Looks to Tilt the Law in Its Favor on Docking Salaried Em-
ployees, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1993, at H02.
153. It is inconsistent with the notion of salaried status to deny an exempt employee his right to
manage his own time-which includes his right to slip away from work for a few hours to attend to
personal matters. See infra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
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performed."'' " The practical effect of salaried status is that an exempt employee is
not entitled to overtime when he works more than forty hours per week and his em-
ployer is not allowed to dock him when he works less than forty hours.'"5
The proponents of the WLFA claim that without it, employers will not be able to
allow unpaid partial day absences by their exempt employees. In actuality, the present
law only prohibits the employer from docking the exempt employee's pay for partial
day absences, it does not prohibit the employee from leaving work for a few hours for
personal reasons. Salaried employees are already permitted partial day absences and
they are not docked for them. 5 6 In Yourman v. Dinkins, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York found that an employer's policy which did not permit
salaried employees to "simply slip away from work for an hour in order to take care of
personal business," but instead, required them to use leave or take leave without pay
for these absences, was inconsistent with the DOL's definition of "salary basis.
1 57
The court suggested that salaried employees have a right to "slip away from work" if
they need to and a restriction of this right would cause their employer to forfeit the
benefit of their salaried status.' The Fourth Circuit agreed that an employee is not
paid on a salary basis if they cannot leave work for a few hours without seeking and
obtaining permission.'59 The Second Circuit held that the salary basis test is not met
when employers require their employees to work at least eight hours a day." These
cases indicate that it would be inconsistent with the notion of salaried status to deny an
exempt employee the discretion to manage his time. This discretion includes the right
to leave work for a few hours without repercussions. 61 Therefore, the WLFA, which
permits employers to dock employees for something that they already have a right to
do, does not broaden the FLSA as claimed. What is family-friendly about reducing the
salaries of employees when they respond to family emergencies? Clearly this bill is not
well suited to its alleged purpose.
The bill's proponents claim that the no pay-docking rule prohibits employers
from having flexible leave policies. They claim that the current law gives employers an
incentive to force their salaried employees to take a full day of leave whenever they
need to leave work for a few hours. However, the bill's proponents have not suggested
how widespread this practice is. The no pay-docking rule has been an integral part of
the regulations for forty years and the proponents of the WLFA have not cited a single
154. Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S 1068
(1991). See also Kinney v. District of Columbia, 994 F.2d 6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (exempt employees
have the discretion to manage their time).
155. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
156. Absent important business interests, the notion of salaried status indicates that the employee
has a right to take a few hours off of work to attend to personal matters. Implicit in this claim is the
assumption that if the employee's desire to take a few hours off conflicts with important business
interests that exist concurrently, the employer has a right to require the employee to fulfill his employ-
ment obligations first.
157. Yourman v. Dinkins, 826 F. Supp. 736, 739-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
158. Id.
159. See Shockley v. City of Newport News, 997 F.2d 18, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1993). See also Service
Employees Int'l Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 784 F. Supp. 1503, 1508 (S.D. Cal.
1992).
160. See Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611, 617 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 298 (1992).
161. See Shockley, 997 F.2d at 24-25 (docking police officers' salaries for partial day absences
constituted a penalty for disciplinary purposes which is prohibited by the DOL regulations).
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instance of an employer denying an employee a partial day absence and requiring them
to take a whole day off of work." In fact, employers may not be able to require that
their employees take the whole day off without forfeiting their exempt status. Although
such a practice might appear to fall within a strict interpretation of the regulations, it
would be completely inconsistent with the spirit of those regulations and the notion of
salaried status. An employer cannot penalize an employee for exercising his right to
slip away from work for a few hours to attend to personal matters. Perhaps this ex-
plains why the bill's proponents have not cited a single instance of an employer at-
tempting to force this upon its employees. The bill's proponents are trying to gain
support for the WLFA by claiming that its purpose is not only consistent with, but an
extension of the FMLA, so they claim that the bill is needed so that employers can
provide flexible leave to their employees. In actuality the bill's purpose is to relieve
employers of potential liability for violating the FLSA.
Although the focus of attention on this bill is centering on the partial day pay-
docking provision, the Senate bill would modify other portions of the salary basis test
at the same time. The Senate bill would effectuate an even greater change in the cur-
rent law by allowing employers to penalize their employees by docking their salaries
for disciplinary reasons. Currently, the DOL regulations only permit deductions from
pay for major safety violations that relate to the prevention of serious danger to the
company, such as rules prohibiting smoking in explosive plants, oil refineries and coal
mines. 63 The rationale for allowing the deduction is that the public interest in pre-
venting violations that could cause such serious harm outweighs the need to narrowly
construe the FLSA in these limited cases. However, the general rule is that penalizing
an employee by docking his pay for disciplinary purposes is inconsistent with salaried
status and will convert a salaried employee to hourly who is entitled to overtime, ex-
cept in the limited circumstances which are dictated by the public interest.'" Hence,
a salaried employee's pay cannot be withheld for disciplinary purposes because it
would constitute reduction in pay based on the quantity or quality of work which is
strictly prohibited by the salary basis test. Courts have consistently ruled that deduc-
tions from pay for non-major infractions of safety rules will defeat exempt status.'
It is difficult to see how the proponents of the WLFA can argue that this change
162. In addition, employees can protect themselves from such behavior through collective bargaining
or by contract.
163. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(5).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Yourman v. Dinkins, 826 F. Supp. 736, 739, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (subjecting em-
ployees to penalties for minor infractions such as: insubordination, abuse of sick leave, refusal to re-
port for drug testing, conduct unbecoming, theft of agency property, and misuse of agency car will
defeat salaried status); Shockley, 997 F.2d at 24-25 (disciplining police officers who left work during
the day for a few hours without permission by reducing their salary was inconsistent with their sala-
ried status); Klein v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 990 F.2d 279, 285 (7th Cir. 1993)
(nurse was not exempt from overtime because her salary was subject to reduction for tardiness and
rude behavior toward fellow staff members); Lacey v. Indiana State Police Dept., 810 F. Supp. 244,
247-48 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (disciplining salaried employees by docking their pay for insubordination,
discourtesy or insolence, abuse of sick leave, tardiness and uncleanliness defeated their salaried status);
Pautlitz v. City of Naperville, 781 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (N.D. 11. 1992) (disciplining police officers
for accepting gratuities by docking their pay is inconsistent with salaried status); Service Employees
Int'l Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 784 F. Supp. 1503, 1508-1511 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (dis-
ciplining probation officers who left work during the day for a few hours without permission was
inconsistent with their salaried status).
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in the law is family-friendly, when it actually allows employers to dock the employee's
salary and thereby reduce the income available to support the family for any disciplin-
ary reasons that the employer chooses. It removes the restriction that only major safety
violations will warrant a reduction in salary and allows employers to dock their
employees' salaries for virtually anything including: tardiness, insubordination, abuse
of sick leave, refusal to report for drug testing, conduct unbecoming, being discourte-
ous, theft of agency property, misuse of agency car, and anything else that the employ-
er finds blameworthy. Proponents of the bill are, in effect, trying to pass pro-employer
legislation that will diminish the rights and benefits already guaranteed to salaried
workers under the guise of family-friendly legislation. They undoubtedly want to ride
on the coattails of the FMLA, hoping that these pro-employer policies will go unno-
ticed.
The actual purpose of the bill, as its proponents allude to, is to let employers off
the hook for past and present violations of the FLSA and to give employers virtually
free reign to determine when and if they should make deductions from their
employees' salaries.
Legislation pushed by employer groups has been introduced in both the House and
Senate to take businesses off the hook, or at least greatly reduce their potential
liability when they violate federal wage hour laws for salaried employees. Employ-
ers would be allowed to dock the pay of salaried employees in most cases without
risking the penalties of the Fair Labor Standards Act.'"
Proponents of the bill allege that the fiscal integrity of American businesses is threat-
ened by the unpredictability in this area of the law. This legislation will allow employ-
ers to escape liability for all past violations of the pay-docking prohibition. The actual
purpose of the bill is to diminish the potential liability companies face in this era of
DOL enforcement, not to assist the modem family or to create a more flexible
workplace as its proponents claim. Prior to the extension of the FLSA to public sector
employees, the DOL was not as diligent in its enforcement of the salary basis test. The
attention brought by the extension of the FLSA to public sector employees focused the
DOL's attention on the FLSA's exemptions for professional, administrative and execu-
tive employees and triggered more active enforcement of its provisions.
The proponents of the WLFA claim that the DOL allowed public sector employ-
ers to dock their employees for partial day absences because it realizes how unfair the
existing policy was.16 While it is true that the existing policy was unfair to public
sector employers, the private sector cannot make the same claim. Any assertion that
private sector employees are no different than public sector employees fails because of
the extensive discussion by the DOL of the differences between the public and private
sector pay systems.1" Private sector employers have not been "blindsided" by the
DOL prohibition against partial day pay-docking as some proponents claim. 69 This
prohibition has existed for decades. The salary basis test was developed in accordance
with private industry practices and employers have had forty years to bring their pay
policies into compliance. As previously discussed, the public sector pay practices were
166. Swoboda, supra note 152.
167. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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not taken into account because public employers were not encompassed by the statute
until 1985. In contrast, the private sector has had decades of notice regarding the pro-
hibition on partial day pay-docking of salaried employees. The DOL's lax enforcement
for a period of years does not justify the manner in which private sector employers,
like Malcolm Pimie, ignored the clear language of the statute. 70 While the DOL did
adopt a non-enforcement policy with respect to public employers, they were always
clear to distinguish the private sector employers who continued to be bound by the
regulations.
In summary, the WLFA is not well suited to its alleged family-friendly purpose.
Its proponents are trying to tie it to the recently passed FMLA, claiming that it furthers
the FMLA's goals. However, the FMLA was enacted to protect the need of low wage
workers to take leave to address family and medical emergencies because most em-
ployer pay policies did not provide such flexibility. The legislative history of the
FMLA details the changes in the composition of the modem family and the demo-
graphics of the workforce which have created a need for this legislation. In contrast,
the WLFA only applies to executive, professional and administrative employees, and
employers, not employees, are the recipients of the benefits of the act. This bill has no
relation to the goals of the FMLA. Although it is true that the WLFA increases flexi-
bility, it does so for the employer, not the employee. If this bill is enacted, the employ-
er will have the flexibility to reduce their employees' salaries for whatever purposes it
chooses. The proposed changes to the rule that prevents penalizing the employee for
disciplinary reasons by docking his pay illustrates the true intent of the act, to increase
the rights of employers, not employees.
V. THE EMPLOYER RELIEF ACT
Although the WLFA is not the worker-friendly bill it claims to be, there may be
some merit to allegations by the bill's proponents that the unpredictability in the law is
unfairly subjecting private sector American businesses to potentially devastating liabili-
ty. The actual purpose of the bill, to relieve employers of liability for past and present
violations of the pay-docking rule, may be warranted by the muddled state of the law
which has left employers and courts alike with little guidance as to the legitimacy of
. 170. Senator Kassebaum suggests that the WLFA should apply retroactively to relieve both private
and public employers of liability for back pay because they were "unaware" of the DOL rules. See
supra note 144 and accompanying text. There are two problems with the Senator's suggestion. First,
there are several arguments supporting the proposition that private and public sector employers deserve
different treatment. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. It is likely that in addition to
trying to ride on the coattails of the FMLA, the Senator is trying to ride on the coattails of the pub-
lic employers' exemption from the no pay-docking rule. When the DOL passed § 541.5d which al-
lowed public sector employers to dock their employees for partial day absences, it tried to relieve
those employers of their potential liability for back pay as well. The DOL found that the no pay-dock-
ing rule was never well suited to public employers' pay policies. The DOL was forced to retract the
proposal because it did not have the power to issue retroactive regulations. However, the DOL does
clearly support relieving public employers from liability for back pay. See 57 Fed. Reg. 37,678 (1992).
The Senator is trying to gain supoort for relieving the private sector businesses of liability by lumping
them with the state and local governments who are deserving of relief. The second problem with the
Senator's suggestion that employers should be relieved of liability because they were "unaware" of the
DOL rules is that ignorance is no excuse for violation of the law. The DOL rules pertaining to the
salary basis test have been in effect for decades. These are not new regulations being imposed on
unsuspecting businesses. It is the employer's duty to know and fulfill the requirements of the salary
basis test if they wish to benefit from the overtime exemption. For these reasons, the Senator's argu-
ment to relieve these employers because they were "unaware" of the rules is unpersuasive.
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pay policies. Perhaps the claim by the proponents of the WLFA, that the fiscal integri-
ty of many American businesses is in jeopardy because of the confusion in the law, is
correct and the solution is to relieve those businesses of liability for their past improp-
er deductions; however, the WLFA proponents should not mask such an attempt with
claims that the bill is family-friendly.
This article agrees with the claims by proponents of the WLFA that the current
state of the law pertaining to private sector employee leave, and in particular, the ap-
plication of the salary basis test to exempt employees, has left employers without
guidance as to the legitimacy of their leave provisions. The judiciary's recent attempts
to interpret the salary basis test have resulted in great confusion in the law, and the
circuits have taken contradictory positions on which pay practices defeat salaried
status."" This article detailed three parts of the DOL regulations which have been
subject to such conflicting interpretations. First, although the language of the DOL
regulations regarding partial day pay-docking seems clear-that any policy which sub-
jects an exempt employee's pay to improper deductions causes the loss of exempt
status-some courts have held that such policies do not cause the forfeiture of the ex-
emption, as long as no deductions actually take place.' These courts have interpret-
ed the regulations in favor of the employer. Second, the regulations are silent regarding
the employer's ability to dock an employee's vacation time for partial day absences.
This has resulted in conflicting court interpretations of the term compensation.' Fi-
nally, according to the literal language of the DOL regulations, employers were entitled
to avoid liability by correcting their mistakes under the "window of correction." This
provision has been the subject of extensive recent litigation in which some courts have
narrowed the window's availability to employers.174 The unsettled nature of the law
has left employers exposed to potentially enormous and generally unexpected liability
for back overtime for employees who would have been exempt except for recent inter-
pretations that certain long-standing pay policies may now fail the salary basis test and
that the "window of correction" may no longer be available to them.
This article argues that either Congress or the Supreme Court 7 must address
the issue of partial day pay-docking, in order to dispense with the non-uniformity in
the circuits. The solution is not to eliminate the pay-docking rule as the WLFA sug-
gests, but to clarify the existing law. It would be unfair to salaried employees to allow
their employers to dock their pay in the manner suggested by the WLFA. Exempt em-
ployees receive no compensation for overtime in exchange for a guarantee of consis-
tency in their compensation. It would be unfaii to penalize them for absences from
work without rewarding them for overtime. After all, employers can dock employees
when they take a full day off of work, the pay-docking prohibition is very limited in
scope, it only applies to partial-day absences.
171. See section III. C. entitled "Private Litigation over the Salary Basis Test" for a detailed analy-
sis of examples of the contradicting views held by federal courts on which pay practices defeat ex-
empt status.
172. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
175. However, the Supreme Court has consistently refused just such a request. See, e.g., Abshire v.
County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068 (1991); Martin v.
Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 298 (1992); McDonnell v.
City of Omaha, 999 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1188 (1994).
1995]
Journal of Legislation
Since the circuits have taken contradictory stances on which pay practices cause
an employee to fail the salary basis test, a higher authority needs to address the issue
to end the confusion. Clarification could appropriately come from either Congress or
the Supreme Court. A bill or holding which proposes to clarify the law would need to
specifically address: (1) whether an existing policy permitting improper deductions is
sufficient to defeat salaried status or whether actual deductions are necessary; (2)
whether deductions from compensatory time should be treated the same as pay deduc-
tions for purposes of the salary basis test; and, (3) when the "window of correction"
can be employed to relieve employers of liability. A solution must also consider
whether to grant public and private employers relief from the potentially enormous
back pay liability they face.'76
This article suggests that the most efficient solution would be for the Supreme
Court to review a salary basis test case to clarify the law. This would bring a quicker
end to the confusion and unpredictability created by lower court decisions. 7 Con-
gress could still enact legislation if it disagreed with the Court's interpretations. Ulti-
mately, congressional legislation may in fact be necessary to relieve public and private
employers of past liability which could cripple, or in many cases completely bankrupt,
American businesses and governments.'
The Court should hold that the language of the regulations clearly indicates that
whenever an employee's salary is "subject to reduction" for improper purposes, the
employee fails the salary basis test and the employer loses the FLSA exemption." It
would be inconsistent with the clear language of the regulations to allow employers to
retain the benefit of the exemption while proffering a policy which would improperly
penalize employees for taking partial day absences. The employer should not be al-
lowed to deter employees from taking partial day absences with the threat that their
pay will be docked, when in fact, the regulations prohibit such a deduction unless the
employer is prepared to forfeit its exemption. The employer should not be able to
threaten an improper deduction any more than it should be allowed to force employees
to take a whole day off when they only need a few hours. Both of these practices are
contrary to the notion of salaried status and in violation of the language and intent of
the DOL regulations.
The statute's intent is to provide broad employment protection, and whether an
employer receives the benefit of the FLSA exemption for his employees is completely
within the employer's control. The employer establishes leave policies and if it wishes
to benefit from the FLSA exemption, it must comply with its terms. Hence, if an em-
ployer has a policy which subjects an employee's pay to improper deductions, that
employee is deemed hourly not salaried, regardless of whether any actual deductions
176. Studies indicate that private sector employers face as much as $39 billion in back pay liabili-
ty. See Andrews, supra note 5, at E622; Petri, supra note 5, at E617; Pressler, supra note 5, at
S10,383.
177. Getting a bill through Congress can take years as illustrated by the FMLA which was an
eight year federal effort. The Supreme Court has the power to dispel confusion more quickly.
178. State and local governments remain exposed to retroactive liability for past violations of the
no pay-docking rule because the DOL is only authorized to make prospective regulations. See supra
note 124 and accompanying text.
179. The DOL's recent refusal to alter the regulations to require an actual deduction to trigger loss
of the exemption is further proof that the DOL's intent was that whenever an employee's pay is "sub-
ject to" an improper deduction the exemption is lost. See 57 Fed. Reg. 37,666, 37,673 (1992).
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were made. It is important to keep in mind that the employer is only restricted from
docking the employee for partial day absences in order to retain the employee's ex-
empt status, the employer is free to dock an employee's pay when he takes a whole
day off.se
Holding that the mere possibility of improper deductions is sufficient to reject an
assertion of exempt status by an employer may force a severe penalty on employers
who previously believed that only an actual deduction would cause the loss of the
exemption. If an employer is found to violate this provision, the employer's entire
exempt workforce would be converted from salaried to hourly and they would be
entitled to back overtime pay for the preceding two years."8 ' Such liability could dev-
astate unsuspecting employers who operate in jurisdictions where the courts have held
that more than a mere possibility is necessary to lose the exemption, and who believed
that they were complying with the FLSA.'82
However, the Portal to Portal Act' provides an escape for employers who in
good faith"s4 complied with and relied upon "any written administrative regulation,
order, ruling, approval, or interpretation... or any administrative practice or enforce-
ment policy" of the DOL." Such a showing constitutes a bar to any action or pro-
ceeding regardless of whether the decision is later modified or rescinded."s This sec-
tion provides a complete defense from any liability or punishment if the employer
meets its requirements.'87
In the case of employers who, like some courts, in good faith relied upon the
DOL Letter Rulings which stated that improper deductions would have to be regular
and recurring before exempt status would be lost, courts could relieve them of their
back pay liability under the Portal Act because they reasonably relied upon a ruling of
the DOL.' 8 Likewise, the Court could hold that good faith reliance upon court opin-
180. However, an employer cannot avoid the intent of the regulations by forcing the employee to
take a full day off because the salaried employee has a right to manage his own time, absent an
important business interest which might require him to be present at certain times. See supra notes
156-162 and accompanying text.
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1992).
182. However, employers in jurisdictions where the courts have interpreted the regulations to indi-
cate that any policy which subjects an employee's pay to improper deductions would not fall within
the category of "unsuspecting employers" because they have a duty to know the law. Likewise, em-
ployers in jurisdictions who have yet to rule on this particular issue are not "unsuspecting employers."
These employers are not free to choose from among the conflicting holdings the one which benefits
them most, and then rely on it. The contradictory rulings should be sufficient to put them on notice
that their pay policies could be interpreted to be in violation of the FLSA, and until their jurisdiction
rules on the issue they should formulate policies which comply with the strictest interpretations of the
regulations.
183. Portal to Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 251
(1982)).
184. "Good faith is a 'subjective requirement, shown if the employer had an honest intention to
ascertain and follow the dictates of the Act."' See Brock v. Claridge Hotel and Casino, 846 F.2d 180,
187 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted), cert. denied, sub norm Claridge Hotel and Casino v.
McLaughlin, 488 U.S. 925 (1988).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 259 (1988).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. For a discussion of the relevant Opinion Letters see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying
text. In Yourman v. Dinkins, 826 F. Supp. 736, 745-746 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), the court held that the
Portal Act defense based upon a Letter Ruling which required actual deductions for partial day absenc-
es before exempt status would be lost could bar liability for back pay, but was limited to partial day
absences and did not apply to other types of salary basis test violations. However, the court, in
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ions which interpreted these Letter Rulings to indicate that only actual deductions
would cause a loss of exempt status could relieve employers of back pay liability.'"
However, this defense should not be available to employers in the jurisdictions which
interpreted the DOL regulations to mean that the possibility of improper deduction
causes the loss of exempt status."9
The defense of good faith is intended to apply only where an employer innocently
and to his detriment, followed the law as it was laid down to him by government
agencies, without notice that such interpretations were claimed to be erroneous or
invalid. It is not intended that this defense shall apply where an employer had
knowledge of conflicting rules and chose to act in accordance with the one most
favorable to him."9'
The regulations are not as clear whether requiring an employee to take leave for
partial day absences would defeat salaried status. This article suggests that the Su-
preme Court should hold that accrued leave should not be treated the same as salary
for purposes of the salary basis test. Employers grant their employees leave in order to
allow them to take time off of work when they need to. It only seems practical to
require them to actually use the leave when they do take the time off. The DOL seems
to agree that employers may dock an employee's leave without forfeiting their exempt
status.192
Finally, the Supreme Court should effectively grant relief to American businesses
who face potentially devastating liability by interpreting the "window of correction"
broadly. The Court should read the language disjunctively, as written, and read in a
good faith requirement. This interpretation would be consistent with the language of
the statute and the DOL regulations. The result of such an interpretation would be to
prevent the egregious offenders from escaping liability, while at the same time offering
some relief to employers who in good faith believed themselves to be complying with
the law. For example, an employer who reimburses his employees on the eve of trial
for improper deductions would not be entitled to benefit from the "window of correc-
tion." If the Court interpreted the "window of correction" in this manner, all cases
brought for back liability could be dismissed as long as the employer had responded
promptly when alerted to his non-compliance. This could save many American busi-
nesses from destruction. However, such a holding would only apply to private sector
employers, it would not relieve state and local governments of the potentially devastat-
ing liability they face for violating a provision that should never have been applied to
them in the first place.'93
Yourman, held that the requirements of the Portal Act were not met because the Letter Ruling did not
discuss deductions for disciplinary penalties, temporary military leave or court attendance. Id. In Brock,
the court held that the ambiguity of the regulation and the government's inconsistency on the legitima-
cy of a certain pay practice supported the defendant's position that he had a reasonable basis for
believing that his pay practice complied with the FLSA provisions. See 846 F.2d at 187.
189. The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as several district courts have reached such
a conclusion. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
191. Yourman, 826 F. Supp. at 747.
192. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. If however, the Court should decide that dock-
ing leave for partial-day absences does fail the salary basis test, employers could again find refuge in
the Portal Act by proving a good faith reliance upon the DOL Letter Rulings and court interpretations
of these Letter Rulings which have reached the opposite conclusion. See id.
193. Even though public employers are currently exempt from the no partial-day pay-docking rule,
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It may be better for Congress to consider the liability faced by private and public
employers for past violations of the FLSA. The legislature, not the judiciary, would be
the proper place to consider the public's interest in relieving private and public em-
ployers of the liability which should attach for past improper deductions. At the pres-
ent time, even public employers (state and local governments) who no longer fall
within the scope of the FLSA's partial day pay-docking prohibition are still exposed to
potentially devastating liability for back overtime.194 Congress should enact legisla-
tion that would relieve public sector employers from liability for past overtime. The
salary basis test was not designed with public employers in mind, and compliance, for
these employers, was impossible in light of the duty they owed to their citizens. In
addition, the back pay owed could cripple many state and local governments, leaving
them unable to function properly. Congress is well equipped to balance these consider-
ations against the need to punish non-compliance with the DOL regulations.
Likewise, the legislature is better equipped than the judiciary to balance the need
to punish businesses for their non-compliance with the FLSA during an era of non-
enforcement19 with the need not to cripple American business. If penalizing Ameri-
can businesses that made improper deductions in the past would result in their bank-
ruptcy, would their employees be better off? It is doubtful that many of these employ-
ees would prefer the back overtime to continued employment. It is the legislature's
province to make such a public policy decision.
An alternative to blanket relief from liability for back overtime would be for
Congress to amend the FLSA to decrease the penalty businesses face for non-compli-
ance and make this amendment retroactive. For example, Congress could change the
FLSA to allow recovery for one year or six months of back overtime when improper
deductions are made, instead of two years as the statute currently provides. However,
Congress would need to balance the need to relieve employers from devastating liabili-
ty with the need to deter future non-compliance. If the penalty is too light, businesses
will not be deterred from making improper deductions in the future.
This article recognizes that contradictory court opinions alone might not be a
sufficient rationale to support relieving employers of their potential liability for violat-
ing the FLSA. However, when determining whether to grant employers relief from the
potentially enormous back pay liability that they face, Congress should consider wheth-
er the penalty for these violations is commensurate with the crimes. Awarding back
pay to an employee who never actually had any improper reduction in his salary re-
sults in a windfall to the employee. Even for those employees whose pay was actually
reduced in accordance with an impermissible policy, the salary reduction is tiny com-
pared to the windfall of back pay. However, the legislature must determine whether the
penalty is meant to be compensatory or punitive in nature, and whether the severity of
the penalty is necessary for deterrent purposes.
This article suggests that while Congress should relieve the public employers
from liability, it should hold their private sector counterparts accountable for their
the potential for retrospective liability for past violations still threatens state and local governments. See
supra note 124 and accompanying text.
194. The DOL could not make § 541.5d retroactive without express authority from Congress.
195. Neither ignorance, nor the belief that penalties for non-compliance would not be enforced
justify violating the law, but Congress may find that the effect of enforcing the penalties that the law
provides for violators is too great.
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blatant violations of a law that has regulated private sector pay policies for de-
cades." After all, the salary basis test was designed to be consistent with the pay
practices in the private sector. It is likely that Malcolm Pimie, like other companies
who violated the FLSA provisions, either thought they could get away with violating
the law because the DOL was not enforcing it rigorously, or they were truly unaware
that the law existed. In either event, Congress should not reward businesses for such
behavior. Certainly, those businesses who knowingly made illegal deductions from the
salaries of their employees deserve to be punished. Furthermore, Congress should hold
businesses to their duty to know the law. Ignorance of the law is no excuse for violat-
ing it. This law has been in effect and applied to private sector employers for decades.
If employers want to benefit from the FLSA exemption from overtime, they must
comply with its requirements. It is the employer's obligation to know the law and
abide by it. Congress should not reward a business' attempt to shield itself from liabili-
ty by claiming ignorance of the law. In either event, businesses should be held liable
for their violations of the law.
Finally, this article suggests that the DOL regulations have become outdated and
are unable to fulfill their intended purpose as currently written. The DOL needs to
update their regulations. For instance, the salary floor test for professional, administra-
tive and executive employees is so low that any minimum wage employee meets its
requirements." The salary floor test has not been changed since 1975, when it was
issued, yet minimum wage has more than doubled since then.'" Clearly those sala-
ries that denoted executive, professional and administrative status in 1975, do not
continue to do so in 1994. This article suggests that in order to ensure that the salary
floor requirement keeps pace with the times, it should be set at three times minimum
wage. 99 This way whenever minimum wage increases, the salary floor test will in-
crease to continue to function effectively as a threshold for professional, executive or
administrative status. The DOL needs to update its regulations in order to continue to
promote Congress' intent that the FLSA have broad application and, therefore its ex-
emptions should be narrowly construed.' The Labor Department currently estimates
that 22 million of the 115 million people in the civilian workforce are salaried, that is
almost twenty percent of the workforce.2"'
VI. CONCLUSION
The current non-uniform state of the law is unfair to employers. However, the
proposed WLFA bill is not the answer. The proposed bill attacks the very foundation
of what it means to be a salaried employee. It would radically change the salary basis
test and result in a windfall for employers, who would be allowed to dock employees
for partial day absences, without being required to compensate them for overtime. If
enacted, the WLFA will undermine the goal of the FLSA to provide broad employ-
ment protection, by making the exemption from overtime very easy to obtain. This
196. However, the article fully supports relieving employers who in good faith complied with and
relied upon DOL Letter Rulings and court interpretations for back pay liability under the Portal Act.
197. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
198. Minimum wage was $2.10 in 1975. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
93-259; 88 Stat. 55 (1974). Minimum wage is currently $4.25.
199. See Zalusky, supra note 33.
200. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
201. See Swoboda, supra note 152.
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would greatly increase the number of employees who qualify for the exemption and,
therefore do not receive the overtime protections of the FLSA. The exemption would
no longer be narrowly construed as Congress intended.' Furthermore, the bill does
not assist modem families as it claims. It is an employer relief bill which has been
proposed to respond to the potentially devastating liability American businesses face
because of the unpredictability in a law with a very severe penalty for violations. The
actual purpose of the bill is to diminish the potential liability companies face in this
era of DOL enforcement. However, such an end may be desirable for public policy
reasons.
This article argues that the Supreme Court would be an ideal place to clarify the
existing law and end the confusion and unpredictability in the circuits. In addition,
Congress needs to address the issue of whether public and private businesses should be
excused from past non-compliance because this requires a value judgment most appro-
priately left to the legislature in our democratic system.
202. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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